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COMMENTS 
PPACA AND THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE:  
A HEALTHY APPROACH TO SEVERABILITY 
Jenna L. Kamiat*
 
 
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, legislation designed to comprehensively reform the U.S. health care 
system.  Soon after the law’s passage, several lawsuits challenged the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate, a key provision requiring nearly 
every American to carry a minimum level of health insurance or face a 
penalty.  Courts have split on whether the individual mandate is outside the 
scope of Congress’s constitutional authority, and those that have struck 
down the provision have had to address what fate should befall the 
remainder of the law. 
Severability doctrine is the exclusive mechanism for the courts to deal 
with questions of partial unconstitutionality in statutes.  As of this writing, 
three courts have addressed the mandate’s severability. All have come to 
divergent conclusions on if, and how much of, the law can be allowed to 
stand if the mandate is excised. 
This Comment analyzes the split of authority regarding the severability 
of the individual mandate.  It asserts that the approach taken by the 
Eleventh Circuit—striking the mandate while leaving the remainder of the 
law intact—is the appropriate course of action for the Supreme Court if it 
finds that the mandate is unconstitutional.  This Comment concludes that 
the judiciary would overstep its constitutional boundaries if it were to strike 
additional provisions of PPACA, and that any subsequent re-working of the 
Act is a task reserved for the legislature. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act1 (PPACA or the Act) 
was enacted in order to confront a “profound and enduring crisis” in the 
health care industry.2  Using a comprehensive scheme of tax measures and 
economic regulations, the legislation seeks to improve the universal 
availability of affordable health care, to furnish protections to consumers 
against discriminatory underwriting practices of insurance companies, and 
to reduce the amount of uncompensated medical care.3
In March 2010, President Obama signed PPACA into law, marking the 
most significant advance in health care policy since the creation of 
Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.
 
4  But the reform “divided Americans like 
few other issues in recent memory,” and led to one of the “longest, most 
rancorous and most partisan debates” seen by Congress in years.5
PPACA’s emergence as a highly contentious object of public debate is 
due in great part to its minimum coverage provision
 
6
 
 1.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered titles of U.S.C.).  These two statutes are collectively known as PPACA, and will be 
referred to as such throughout this Comment in order to designate the health care legislation 
and its amendments.   
—the so-called 
 2.  Consolidated Brief for Respondents at 2, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, --- 
S. Ct. --- (2011) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400), 2011 WL 4941020, at *2; see also Dan Balz, 
Introduction to WASH. POST, LANDMARK:  THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S NEW HEALTH-
CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 1, 4–6 (2010) [hereinafter LANDMARK] (tracing 
the origins of the health care debate to Theodore Roosevelt’s call for nationalized health 
insurance during his 1912 presidential bid, and noting its omnipresence in public policy 
discussions ever since). 
 3. Consolidated Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
 4. Balz, supra note 2, at 1. 
 5. Id. at 1–2.  For a comprehensive discussion of the political forces that shaped the 
debate, see generally Ceci Connolly, Part I:  How We Got Here, in LANDMARK, supra note 2. 
 6. T.R. Goldman, Health Policy Brief:  Legal Challenges to Health Reform, HEALTH 
AFF. (Nov. 30, 2011), available at http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_
pdfs/healthpolicybrief_58.pdf.  
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individual mandate.7  Many have argued that Congress overstepped its 
constitutional boundaries in passing PPACA,8 and various suits specifically 
challenging the validity of the individual mandate have commenced.9  As 
these challenges move through the judicial process, courts have disagreed 
on the primary issue of whether the minimum coverage provision of 
PPACA is a constitutional exercise of legislative power.10
The subsidiary issue of severability has been equally disputed yet less 
frequently discussed.  Severability doctrine guides the judiciary when 
courts are faced with a statute that may be partially valid and partially 
invalid.
 
11  The inquiry is whether the valid components of a statute may be 
enforced separately from its invalid provisions, or whether a finding of 
partial unconstitutionality affects the legislation such that it must fail in its 
entirety.12  Such a determination is second in importance only to the initial 
assessment of constitutionality,13 particularly in the case of PPACA, where 
the viability of an entire legislative scheme may turn on the constitutionality 
of a single provision.14
On November 14, 2011, the Supreme Court granted review of the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision on both issues:  the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate and its severability.
 
15  In March 2012, the Court heard a 
virtually unprecedented five-and-a-half hours of oral argument regarding 
the constitutionality of the individual mandate, including ninety minutes of 
argument about whether the remainder of the law may stand if the provision 
is struck.16  The Court is expected to issue its ruling in June 2012.17
The Court must ascertain whether finding the individual mandate 
unconstitutional so affects the functionality of PPACA that either the entire 
law must fall or certain related provisions must be struck down alongside it.  
 
 
 7. PPACA § 1501, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010).  For an explanation of the 
individual mandate provision, see infra Part I.C.1. 
 8. Wilson Huhn, Constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
Under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 139, 
143 (2011). 
 9. See, e.g., id. at 142–43; Bryan J. Leitch, Where Law Meets Politics:  Freedom of 
Contract, Federalism, and the Fight over Health Care, 27 J.L. & POL. 177, 178–79 (2011); 
Ben Pershing, Opponents of Health-Reform Bill Look to Supreme Court; Mandate Is 
Questioned; Democrats Dismiss Constitutionality Issue, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2010, at A3; 
Warren Richey, Attorneys General in 11 States Poised to Challenge Healthcare Bill, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/
0322/Attorneys-general-in-11-states-poised-to-challenge-healthcare-bill. 
 10. For a summary of the pending litigation, see infra notes 142–46, 148 and 
accompanying text. 
 11. 2 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 44:1 (7th ed. 2009); see infra Part I.A. 
 12. 2 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 11, § 44:1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Ryan M. Scoville, The New General Common Law of Severability 3 (Marquette 
Univ. Law Sch., Legal Studies Working Paper No. 11-22, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1939944. 
 15. Florida ex rel Att’y Gen. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th 
Cir.), cert granted, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011). 
 16. See Goldman, supra note 6. 
 17. Id. 
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The lower courts have adopted sharply disparate lines of reasoning on this 
issue, and this split of authority has created substantial uncertainty about the 
future of health care reform—specifically, which aspects of the law will 
remain applicable if the Supreme Court finds the provision to be 
unconstitutional.18
Two fundamental points of contention are (1) whether the individual 
mandate is so integral to PPACA that the law cannot fulfill its legislative 
purpose in the mandate’s absence and therefore must be found 
inseverable,
  The Court’s decision will have important ramifications 
for the severability of complex and highly specialized legislation, and is an 
important aspect of the debate surrounding health care reform. 
19 and (2) alternatively, if the individual mandate is so closely 
linked to the guaranteed issue and preexisting condition provisions that a 
finding of unconstitutionality would require all three provisions to be 
excised.20
In Part I, this Comment explains the current state of the Supreme Court’s 
severability jurisprudence and surveys the recent landscape of health care 
reform.  Part II surveys the split of authority regarding the individual 
mandate’s severability, as well as its ramifications for related provisions 
and for the law as a whole.  This part explores the divergent arguments that 
have emerged regarding the application of severability doctrine, and how 
courts have undertaken the severability analysis in the context of PPACA 
and the individual mandate.  Finally, Part III argues that, if found 
unconstitutional, the individual mandate is severable, meaning that the 
balance of PPACA should remain valid as law.  This part contends that 
striking additional provisions of the Act would be an inappropriate, quasi-
legislative act irreconcilable with severability’s fundamental notions of 
judicial restraint and separation of powers.  Upon a finding of 
unconstitutionality, any required rebalancing of the Act should be left to 
Congress. 
  This Comment addresses the split of authority regarding these 
issues. 
I.  SEVERABILITY AND HEALTH CARE REFORM 
In order to understand the present disagreement over the individual 
mandate’s severability, it is essential to review the Supreme Court’s 
approach to the doctrine as well as the principal political and cultural 
dynamics informing the health care debate.  Although the elements of 
severability analysis are clearly delineated, the doctrine’s application is 
plagued by practical difficulties.  Part I.A begins by providing an 
explanation of severability doctrine, and details the standards for 
severability analysis as enunciated and applied by the Supreme Court.  This 
discussion highlights the lack of clarity and inconsistency in the Court’s 
severability jurisprudence to provide context for the stark differences in 
 
 18. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Sebelius, 648 F.3d 1235 (No. 11-393), 2011 WL 
4479107, at *9. 
 19. See infra Part II.A. 
 20. See infra Part II.B. 
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how lower courts have applied the doctrine to PPACA.  Part I.B then briefly 
reviews the background of health care reform—notably, the concerns 
leading up to the passage of PPACA and the individual mandate.  Finally, 
Part I.C outlines the key provisions of PPACA that are under scrutiny, 
focusing on the individual mandate and related insurance reforms.21
A.  An Overview of Severability 
 
1.  Severability Doctrine Generally 
A law is rarely unconstitutional in its entirety.22  The doctrine of 
severability governs whether a court may separate, or “sever,” the 
unconstitutional provisions or applications of a law, effectively excising 
them such that the constitutional provisions of the statute may remain in 
force.23  This doctrinal inquiry is the exclusive mechanism by which courts 
grapple with issues of partial unconstitutionality in legislation.24  Any 
finding that a statute is partially unconstitutional necessitates an inquiry into 
what will become of its constitutionally valid remainder;25 thus, severability 
has a “long pedigree,” and has evolved into an integral and pervasive 
component of judicial review of any statutory scheme.26  The applicability 
of sweeping legislative schemes may ultimately depend on the severability 
of one unconstitutional provision.27
When undertaking a severability analysis, courts endeavor to determine 
whether a statute may remain in effect, and to what extent, if a portion of it 
is found to be unconstitutional.
 
28  The inquiry is guided by several 
interrelated concepts of statutory construction.29
 
 21. This Comment does not analyze the constitutionality of the individual mandate, or 
PPACA’s ability to achieve health care reform.  Rather, this Comment focuses on providing 
a general overview of severability with an emphasis on how its principles have been (and 
should be) applied in a severability analysis of the individual mandate. 
  The cornerstone of these 
principles is that statutes should be interpreted to preserve their 
 22. Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 739 (2010). 
 23. Id. at 740. 
 24. Id. at 745; see 2 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 11, § 44:20 (noting that since 
“legislative activity [is] rapidly expanding, many enactments will contain questionable 
elements,” giving severability an “increasingly important role” in litigation); see also supra 
notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
 25. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 22, at 741 (asserting that, “[s]een or unseen, severability 
doctrine is omnipresent in judicial review as currently understood,” and that “every holding 
of partial unconstitutionality that does not lead to total invalidation necessarily rests on 
severability, implicitly if not explicitly”); Scoville, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that “[t]he 
doctrine is frequently relevant because any holding of a statute’s partial invalidity will give 
rise to questions concerning what to do with the valid remainder”). 
 26. Walsh, supra note 22, at 739–40 (tracing the origins of severability jurisprudence to 
Marbury v. Madison). 
 27. Scoville, supra note 14, at 3 (stating that severability “doctrine is powerful because 
the viability of large statutory schemes can hinge entirely on whether or not an 
unconstitutional component is severable”). 
 28. John C. Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203, 204 (1993). 
 29. 2 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 11, § 44:1. 
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constitutionality whenever possible.30  Courts are encouraged to exercise 
prudence and restraint when conducting inquiries into severability, guided 
by the idea that findings of constitutional invalidity “frustrate[] the intent of 
the elected representatives of the people” such that courts should “refrain 
from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary.”31  The current 
test32 requires courts to discern what the legislature would have done, rather 
than what it actually did.33  Such a determination can be highly 
speculative34 and stands in stark contrast to the nature of most other 
interpretive inquiries.35  Thus, severability doctrine confers a substantial 
amount of discretion on the judiciary, potentially permitting courts to 
declare entire laws unconstitutional that are only partially invalid.36  
Nevertheless, courts generally presume severability, acknowledging their 
obligation to uphold portions of legislation whenever they can be separated 
from those that are invalid.37
Courts and commentators have disagreed over the manner in which these 
principles have developed and been applied, generating scholarly criticism 
of severability doctrine on virtually every plausible basis.
 
38  The 
jurisprudence is murky in this area, as the Supreme Court has not always 
explained its enunciated severability standards, laying out conclusive 
rejections or presumptions with little indication of the underlying rationale, 
and “offer[ing] little explanation of why certain presumptions are 
warranted, how they operate, or how they relate to each other.”39
 
 30. Id.; see also El Paso & Ne. Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909) (“[I]t is the 
duty of the court, where it can do so without doing violence to the terms of an act, to 
construe it so as to maintain its constitutionality.”). 
  
 31. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652–53 (1984) (plurality opinion); see also 
Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 227, 240–41 (2004). 
 32. See infra notes 54–61 and accompanying text. 
 33. Walsh, supra note 22, at 740. 
 34. Id. at 749 (“Excision requires deployment of a destructive doctrine that is subject to 
manipulation because of the counterfactual speculation that it requires.”). 
 35. See id. at 740–41. 
 36. See id. 
 37. 2 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 11, § 44:1; see also El Paso & Ne. Ry. Co. v. 
Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909) (“[W]henever an act of Congress contains unobjectionable 
provisions separable from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of this court to so 
declare, and to maintain the act in so far as it is valid.”). 
 38. See Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 41, 
41–42 (1995) (noting that academic criticism has designated severability doctrine as 
simultaneously being “too malleable and as too rigid; as encouraging judicial overreaching 
and as encouraging judicial abdication,” as reliant and as indifferent to legislative intent, as 
too attentive and too inattentive to political concerns, and as generally lacking of “any 
coherent explanation”); Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the 
Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REV. 76, 76–77 (1937) (explaining that the Supreme Court 
fluctuated between negative and positive severability presumptions, employed conflicting 
rules inconsistently and without explanation, and disregarded explicit manifestations of 
Congress’s wishes).  Stern’s article is widely acknowledged as the seminal work on 
severability. See Walsh, supra note 22, at 749. 
 39. Nagle, supra note 28, at 218; see also id. at 225 (“The confusion surrounding 
presumptions and the absence of a consistent effort to explain how severability fits within 
broader theories of judicial review and statutory construction has left all of the various tests 
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Consequently, severability doctrine has varied considerably over time with 
little context for its ideological shifts,40
The severability inquiry is “eased” when Congress specifically includes a 
severability clause in the body of a statute.
 and lower courts have struggled to 
apply the doctrine uniformly. 
41  A severability clause “creates 
a presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the statute in 
question to depend on the validity of the constitutionally offensive 
provision.”42  Conversely, if Congress fails to include a severability clause, 
its absence does not raise a presumption against severability; the silence is 
“just that—silence.”43  The absence of a severability clause may take on 
greater significance when one is included in earlier versions of the bill, but 
is later removed, but such an occurrence is also not dispositive.44  
Consequently, the Court maintains its focus on extrinsic indications of 
legislative intent and on the practical and functional viability of the post-
severance statutory scheme.45  A severability clause is therefore not 
dispositive of the issue, and merely “preserves the general presumption of 
severability.”46
2.  Severability Jurisprudence 
 
The seminal case articulating the contemporary approach to 
severability47 is Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock.48
 
used over the years unanchored by a principled approach.”); Shumsky, supra note 
  Members of the airline 
industry challenged a legislative veto provision in the Employee Protection 
Program (EPP) duty-to-hire section of the Airline Deregulation Act of 
31, at 
242–43 (suggesting that in the Alaska Airlines decision, “[a]s was typical of its prior 
jurisprudence in the area, the Court spent little time justifying the severability tests it 
enunciated”).  Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987), articulates the 
contemporary approach to severability, and is discussed in further detail infra at note 48 and 
accompanying text. See also Stern, supra note 38, at 78 (“Only if the apparent 
inconsistencies in Supreme Court [severability] decisions are exposed and explained, as they 
have not been by the Court itself, can a conscious effort be made to formulate 
understandable and sensible principles for the future.”). 
 40. See Scoville, supra note 14, at 4.  For further discussion on the inconsistent 
development of severability doctrine, see Nagle, supra note 28, at 218 (discussing the 
Court’s historical fluctuation between employing a presumption of severability versus one of 
inseverability); Shumsky, supra note 31, at 232, 245 (noting the Court’s historical tendency 
to disregard severability clauses). 
 41. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686. 
 42. Id.; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932 (1983); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. 
Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932). 
 43. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686; see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684 
(1971) (“[T]he absence of an express severability provision in the Act [does not] dictate the 
demise of the entire statute.”). 
 44. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Family Research Council in Support of 
Appellees/Cross-Appellants and Affirmance in Part at 22–23, Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (2011) (Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067), 
2011 WL 2530503, at *22–23. 
 45. See Shumsky, supra note 31, at 230. 
 46. Id. at 243. 
 47. See id. at 241 (referring to Alaska Airlines as the Court’s “leading contemporary 
opinion on severability”). 
 48. 480 U.S. 678 (1987). 
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1978.49  These plaintiffs argued that the veto was unconstitutional, and that 
the entire EPP section of the Act needed to be invalidated as a result.50  The 
Court first looked to the relevant section’s language and structure, and 
determined that the duty-to-hire provision was sufficiently detailed and 
clear to stand on its own, independent of its accompanying provisions.51  
The Court then examined the statute’s legislative history, and, based on the 
relative unimportance of the legislative veto during congressional hearings, 
concluded that Congress would have enacted the rest of the EPP as well as 
the entire Airline Deregulation Act regardless of a legislative veto 
provision.52
Two decades later, in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New 
England,
 
53
 First, [courts should] try not to nullify more of a legislature’s work 
than is necessary. . . . 
 the Supreme Court articulated three interrelated principles that 
should inform any analysis of severability:   
 Second, mindful that [the court’s] constitutional mandate and 
institutional competence are limited, [courts] restrain [them]selves from 
“rewrit[ing] law to conform it to constitutional requirements” even as we 
try to salvage it. . . . 
 Third, the touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative 
intent, for a court “cannot use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent 
of the legislature.”54
The inquiry into legislative intent is pivotal for a determination of 
severability.
 
55  A court must therefore examine whether the legislature 
would have preferred what is left of the statute to no statute at all.56  This 
well-established test stipulates that “[u]nless it is evident that the 
Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its 
power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped 
if what is left is fully operative as a law.”57  In other words, the 
unconstitutional provision must be severed (and the remainder of the law 
left in force), unless the resulting statutory scheme is one that the legislature 
would not have enacted, or that is incapable of functioning independently.58
This test further stipulates that courts must probe beyond whether the 
remainder of the statute is capable of functioning as a practical matter, to 
whether the remainder of the statute will “function in a manner consistent 
 
 
 49. Id. at 680–81. 
 50. Id. at 683. 
 51. Id. at 687–91. 
 52. See id. at 692–97; Shumsky, supra note 31, at 242. 
 53. 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 
397 (1988); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)). 
 54. Id. at 329–30. 
 55. See id. at 330; Walsh, supra note 22, at 740. 
 56. See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330; Walsh, supra note 22, at 740. 
 57. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 421 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) 
(per curiam)). 
 58. See id. 
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with the intent of Congress.”59  Thus, courts must ascertain whether or not 
the remaining provisions of the legislation can achieve their congressional 
purpose.60  In ascertaining legislative intent, the Court looks to the language 
and structure of the law, as well as its legislative history.61
The Court in Ayotte went on to hold that wholesale invalidation of the 
New Hampshire law under scrutiny was an inappropriate remedy.
 
62  The 
Court held that application of New Hampshire’s statute would only create 
constitutional issues in a few instances, and injunctive relief could have 
been crafted more modestly to enjoin the statute’s application in those 
limited instances, so long as such relief remained faithful to the intent of 
New Hampshire’s legislature in enacting the statute.63
The Supreme Court’s decision in New York v. United States
 
64 further 
contributed to its severability jurisprudence, and is particularly instructive 
with respect to the divergence over PPACA’s individual mandate.  A 
challenge was brought regarding a provision of the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Act, which required states to properly dispose of waste 
generated within the state, or be forced to assume title to it and be held 
liable for any damages resulting from its non-disposal.65  The Court 
concluded that the provision was unconstitutional, but held that it could be 
severed from the rest of the Act.66
In that instance, Congress had enacted a comprehensive scheme to 
address the lack of regulation of radioactive waste.
 
67  The Court reasoned 
that “[c]ommon sense” suggests that if Congress creates a legislative 
scheme for a particular and explicit purpose, and that scheme includes 
various provisions operating to achieve that purpose, “the invalidation of 
one [provision] should not ordinarily cause Congress’ overall intent to be 
frustrated.”68  Without a “take title” provision, the Act could still operate in 
accordance with Congress’s overall objective of encouraging states to 
regulate low-level radioactive waste within their borders, because the Act 
contained a variety of other incentives targeted toward furtherance of that 
goal.69  When the purpose of a statute is not defeated by invalidation of the 
offensive provision, the Court concluded, the remainder of the legislation 
should remain in force.70
 
 59. Id. 
 
 60. Id.; see also Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 1:10-CV-
763, 2011 WL 4072875, at *19 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011). 
 61. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 687. 
 62. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 331 (2006).  The 
statute in question prohibited doctors from performing abortions on pregnant minors until 48 
hours after written notice of a pending abortion was delivered to a parent or guardian. Id. at 
323–24. 
 63. Id. at 330–31. 
 64. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 65. Id. at 149–54. 
 66. Id. at 186. 
 67. Id. at 150–51. 
 68. Id. at 186. 
 69. Id. at 187. 
 70. See id. 
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The Court most recently echoed and applied its severability principles in 
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.71  
The case involved a challenge to the provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 that created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(Board).72  Members of the Board were to be appointed by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), though the SEC was precluded from 
later removing these members except for good cause.73  The petitioners 
claimed that this system violated principles of separation of powers, 
affording members of the Board two-layer insulation from the President.74  
In other words, the petitioners claimed that the statute violated the 
Constitution because the SEC could not remove Board members except for 
cause, and, in turn, the President could not remove SEC Commissioners 
except for cause.75  Thus, the petitioners argued that members of the Board 
were delegated executive power but immunized from presidential control.76  
The petitioners contended that this arrangement was contrary to Article II’s 
vesting of the executive power in the President,77 and, accordingly, 
rendered the Board and “all power and authority exercised by it” 
unconstitutional.78  Both the district court and court of appeals found the 
removal provisions permissible,79
The Supreme Court disagreed with the petitioners’ chosen remedy of 
wholesale invalidation, finding the removal provisions unconstitutional, but 
rejecting the contention that the constitutional violation undermined the 
entire existence of the Board.
 and thus did not reach the question of 
severability. 
80  The Court asserted that, after excising the 
invalid removal restrictions, the SEC could remove Board members at will, 
leaving only one permissible level of “good-cause tenure” between the 
President and the Board.81  Accordingly, the Court reasoned that the 
removal provisions were severable, and that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
remained “fully operative as a law” with the offensive provisions excised.82  
Thus, absent evidence that Congress would not have enacted Sarbanes-
Oxley without the removal provisions, the Court was bound to uphold the 
remainder of the law because it was capable of functioning independently.83
The Court acknowledged that a variety of remedies could have been 
employed to remedy the constitutional violation, such as judicially re-
 
 
 71. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
 72. See id. at 3149. 
 73. Id. at 3147–48. 
 74. See id. at 3149. 
 75. See id. at 3148–49. 
 76. See id. at 3149. 
 77. See id. at 3147 (holding that the President’s constitutional obligation to oversee the 
faithful execution of laws is impaired when an officer with delegated executive authority has 
multilevel protection from removal). 
 78. See id. at 3161. 
 79. See id. at 3149. 
 80. See id. at 3161. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992)). 
 83. See id. at 3161–62. 
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working the duties of the Board to modify its classification under the 
Constitution, restricting the enforcement powers of the Board, or asserting 
that Board members could be removable by the President in the future.84  
However, the Court emphasized that its inquiry was limited to questions of 
legislative severability; a holding more extensive than that would violate 
principles of judicial restraint and encroach upon the powers and 
responsibilities of Congress.85  The Court noted that Congress could 
subsequently revise the legislation if it was displeased with the resulting, 
post-excision statute.86
B.  Health Care Reform 
 
Prior to PPACA’s enactment, the health insurance market was 
characterized by rapidly rising costs and diminishing participation.87  The 
number of uninsured individuals in the United States has increased almost 
every year, rising by 8 million in the past decade, largely due to the 
escalating cost of maintaining health care coverage.88  Commentators 
attributed non-participation to the insurance industry’s profit-seeking 
strategies—namely, medical underwriting and discrimination based upon 
preexisting conditions.89
A principal impetus for health care reform was the exclusionary effect of 
health-status underwriting practices employed by the private insurance 
industry.
   
90  In general, private insurance could companies either flatly deny 
coverage to individuals with preexisting conditions,91 or offer such 
individuals coverage at prohibitively higher premiums.92
 
 84. Id. at 3162. 
  This policy 
effectively excluded both impoverished and unhealthy individuals from 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Nan D. Hunter, Health Insurance Reform and Intimations of Citizenship, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1955, 1973–74 (2011) (noting that increases in insurance premiums outpaced the 
rate of growth in income, and that, in 2007, forty-six million individuals were uninsured and 
one in four households elected not to pursue “medical care due to cost”); see also Amy 
Goldstein, Priority One:  Expanding Coverage, in LANDMARK, supra note 2, at 73, 75. 
 88. Goldstein, supra note 87, at 75. 
 89. Hunter, supra note 87, at 1974. Medical underwriting is the process by which 
insurance providers determine and assign risk for particular policies—a costly process in 
itself which contributes to high premiums. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Complete Severability (Severability) at 26, Florida ex rel Att’y Gen. v. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (2011) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400), 2012 WL 588458, at 
*26.  
 90. See Lawrence O. Gostin & Elenora E. Connors, Health Care Reform in Transition:  
Insurance Reform Without an Individual Mandate, 303 JAMA 1188, 1188 (2010), available 
at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1382&context=facpub; 
see also Hunter, supra note 87, at 1973 (“Expanding access to coverage required reforming 
two profit-boosting strategies that underlay these problems [of rising costs and diminishing 
participation]: medical underwriting and discrimination based on preexisting conditions.”). 
 91. Patients are deemed to have preexisting conditions when they receive a diagnosis or 
treatment for a medical condition or illness prior to seeking coverage. Gostin & Connors, 
supra note 90, at 1188; Hunter, supra note 87, at 1974–75. 
 92. See Gostin & Connors, supra note 90, at 1188; Hunter, supra note 87, at 1974. 
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obtaining insurance coverage by either pricing them out of the market or by 
an outright denial.93
Reform efforts also targeted rapidly rising costs, specifically the costs 
resulting from consumption of medical services by the uninsured.
 
94  
Congress found that when the uninsured seek medical treatment, many 
either cannot or choose not to pay for the full cost of their medical care, 
which subsequently shifts the costs to medical providers.95  Medical 
providers must then impose higher charges, which shifts the unpaid costs to 
insurance companies.96  Insurance companies then raise premiums on their 
outstanding health policies.97  Thus, insured individuals incur higher 
premiums, and are essentially subsidizing the medical care of those who 
lack insurance.98  The cycle perpetuates itself, as many who forego 
insurance do so because of high premiums.99
The current health care market depends upon the efficiency of “risk 
pools.”
  
100  Theoretically, a functional system of private health insurance 
spreads aggregate risk and cost uniformly across the insured population in 
order for all individuals to receive affordable medical care when needed.101  
When all individuals across a population are required to maintain coverage, 
premiums should remain stable and predictable because the high costs of 
unhealthy individuals are dispersed evenly throughout the entire 
population.102  Thus, in order to achieve material improvement in overall 
health care access, insurers likely need to insure everyone, thereby 
accepting more high-cost individuals, as well as more healthy individuals to 
mitigate increasing premiums.103  Without this efficiency, premiums would 
be too high for large segments of the population to maintain adequate 
insurance.104
 
 
 
 93. See Gostin & Connors, supra note 90, at 1188; Hunter, supra note 87, at 1974. 
 94. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 
1244 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. granted in 
part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F) (Supp. IV 2010) (estimating 
that the cost of providing uncompensated medical care to uninsured individuals was $43 
billion during 2008). 
 95. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1244; 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F). 
 96. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1244. 
 97. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1244; 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F). 
 98. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1244. 
 99. Id.  In fact, one of the plaintiffs arguing against the individual mandate was forced to 
drop her family’s health insurance policy “because the $1,100-a-month cost was prohibitive” 
for a small-business owner. Emily Maltby et al., Hurdle for Health-Law Suit, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 5, 2011, at A3. 
 100. Gostin & Connors, supra note 90, at 1188; Leitch, supra note 9, at 179–80. 
 101. Gostin & Connors, supra note 90, at 1188; Leitch, supra note 9, at 179. 
 102. Gostin & Connors, supra note 90, at 1188; Leitch, supra note 9, at 179–80. 
 103. Gostin & Connors, supra note 90, at 1188–89; Leitch, supra note 9, at 180. 
 104. Lawrence O. Gostin & Elenora E. Connors, Health Care Reform — A Historic 
Moment in US Social Policy, 303 JAMA 2521, 2521 (2010), available at 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/384 (estimating that in 2008, 46.3 million 
individuals in the U.S. were uninsured, and 25 million were underinsured). 
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C.  Key Provisions of PPACA 
The central goal of PPACA is to help Americans obtain adequate and 
affordable health insurance.105  It aims to achieve this goal by 
(1) expanding access to medical care by eliminating barriers to obtaining 
insurance coverage, (2) increasing the role of consumers in selecting their 
insurance, and (3) proscribing discriminatory practices of insurance 
companies against those with preexisting conditions.106  More specifically, 
reform efforts sought to eliminate medical underwriting and discrimination 
based on health status in order to open the health insurance market to all 
individuals, and consequently expand coverage to those with the greatest 
need.107  Congress believed that addressing these concerns would not only 
decrease the number of uninsured, but could also lead to a reduction in 
health insurance premiums, thus reducing the costs incurred industry-wide 
from both medical underwriting and uncompensated medical costs.108
1.  The Individual Mandate 
   
The minimum coverage position, or individual mandate, is the focal point 
of the debates surrounding PPACA, and lies at the heart of the Act’s 
insurance provisions.109  Beginning in 2014, this provision will require 
most U.S. citizens, nationals, and legal aliens to maintain minimum 
essential health insurance coverage.110  Satisfactory coverage may be 
procured through an employer, enrollment in government health programs, 
or the purchase of an individual policy on the open market.111  Failure to 
maintain adequate coverage will result in a penalty of $695 per person (but 
not exceeding $2,085 per family), or 2.5 percent of family income, 
whichever is greater.112
The law provides several exceptions to the minimum coverage 
requirement.  For instance, individuals with incomes too low to file federal 
taxes will be exempted; additionally, an individual may petition for an 
exemption if the cost of obtaining and maintaining coverage will exceed 
8 percent of household income.
 
113  The law also contains exemptions for 
incarcerated individuals, Native American tribe members, and those who 
decline insurance for religious reasons.114  The law also provides a three-
month grace period before a penalty is imposed for lack of coverage.115
 
 105. Goldstein, supra note 
 
87, at 73. 
 106. Gostin & Connors, supra note 104, at 2522. 
 107. Hunter, supra note 87, at 1974. 
 108. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1245–46. 
 109. Alec MacGillis, The Individual Mandate:  How It Will Work, in LANDMARK, supra 
note 2, at 85, 85. 
 110. PPACA § 1501, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(b) (Supp. IV 2010); see also Goldman, 
Health Policy Brief:  Legal Challenges to Health Reform, HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 31, 2011), 
available at http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_54.pdf. 
 111. PPACA § 1501(f), 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f); see also Goldman, supra note 110, at 2. 
 112. Goldman, supra note 110, at 2. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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The individual mandate has been referred to as the “linchpin” of 
PPACA,116 and as Congress’s “magic bullet” to achieving near-universal 
coverage and lower aggregate industry costs.117  Theoretically, the mandate 
is an essential mechanism to achieve PPACA’s heightened regulatory 
scheme without scrapping a market-based system of health insurance in 
favor of a government-run single-payer insurance program.118  At a basic 
level of understanding, insurance operates by spreading risk.119  For 
example, Americans who receive health insurance through large employers 
share their costs broadly across this pool, where older employees pay the 
same amount as younger employees.120  In the individual insurance market, 
the spreading of risk did not function as efficiently prior to the passage of 
reform because younger, healthier individuals could elect not to obtain 
coverage.121  Consequently, older, sicker participants comprise a large part 
of the individual insurance market, as they consume a higher amount of 
medical care.  This skew in the participating population led to higher rates 
in the individual market, making it even less likely that younger or healthier 
individuals would decide to purchase insurance.122
Under the guaranteed issue
 
123 and preexisting condition124 provisions of 
PPACA, insurers are required to issue coverage to high-cost, unhealthy 
individuals.125
 
 116. See, e.g., Marc Siegel, The Individual Mandate Is Obamacare’s Linchpin, NAT’L 
REV. (Aug. 15, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/274576/individual-
mandate-obamacare-s-linchpin-marc-siegel. 
  Unless healthy individuals are simultaneously required to 
purchase insurance and become part of the overall risk pool, the private 
 117. Brief for Private Petitioners on Severability at 27, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400) 2012 WL 72440, at *27; MacGillis, 
supra note 109, at 87. 
 118. Hunter, supra note 87, at 1974. 
 119. MacGillis, supra note 109, at 87. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. Approximately one-third of individuals aged 20 to 29 elect not to obtain health 
insurance coverage. Id. This rate of non-participation is double that of individuals aged 30 to 
64. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. PPACA § 2702(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a) (Supp. IV 2010) (“[E]ach health 
insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the individual or group market in a 
State must accept every employer and individual in the State that applies for such 
coverage.”); see also id. § 2703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2(a) (“[I]f a health insurance issuer 
offers health insurance coverage in the individual or group market, the issuer must renew or 
continue in force such coverage at the option of the plan sponsor or the individual, as 
applicable.”). 
 124. Id. § 2704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3(a) (“A group health plan and a health insurance 
issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage may not impose any 
preexisting condition exclusion with respect to such plan or coverage.”); see also id. 
§ 2705(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a) (prohibiting health insurance issuers from establishing 
rules for eligibility based on health status, medical condition (both physical and mental), 
claims history, prior receipt of medical care, medical history, genetic information, disability, 
evidence of insurability, or any other health-status-related factor determined appropriate by 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services). 
 125. See MacGillis, supra note 109, at 87 (“[I]nsurers argue, with justification, that if 
they have to offer affordable coverage to people with serious medical conditions, then they 
need to have younger and healthier people in the pool.  And the only way to make sure that 
those people obtain coverage is to require it.”). 
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insurance market would have suffered from rising expenditures alongside 
reduced income from premiums.126  The mandate is considered by some to 
be critical to mitigating those effects and to stabilizing the private health 
insurance market.127  Mandating that healthy individuals purchase 
comprehensive insurance coverage would have the practical effect of giving 
a $30 billion subsidy to insurance companies each year, thus affording 
insurers the means to provide coverage to high-risk individuals at 
artificially lower premiums.128
Congress has also acknowledged in the Act itself that the individual 
mandate is crucial to the Act’s overarching goals of expanding the 
availability of affordable health insurance coverage and protecting 
individuals with preexisting medical conditions: 
 
[I]f there were no [individual mandate], many individuals would wait to 
purchase health insurance until they needed care. . . .  The [individual 
mandate] is essential to creating effective health insurance markets in 
which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and 
do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.129
2.  Guaranteed Issue, Preexisting Conditions, and Community Rating 
 
In order to combat the negative effects of discriminatory insurance 
practices,130 Congress enacted the guaranteed issue provision alongside the 
prohibition on preexisting conditions.  This provision forces insurance 
companies to provide coverage to high-cost individuals by requiring 
insurers to both issue and renew coverage to applicants without gaps and 
exclusions in coverage.131
As of 2014, the guaranteed issue provision requires insurers to issue 
coverage to every employer or individual who applies in the individual or 
group markets.
  This provision works in conjunction with the 
preexisting condition exclusion prohibition, barring companies from 
denying or limiting coverage to individuals based on health status. 
132  Insurers are also required to renew or maintain coverage 
at the insured’s prerogative,133 with limited exceptions such as fraud and 
premium nonpayment.134
 
 126. Id.; Hunter, supra note 
  Insurers will also no longer be permitted to 
87, at 1975. 
 127. Hunter, supra note 87, at 1976. 
 128. Brief for Private Petitioners on Severability, supra note 117, at 27. 
 129. PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I). 
 130. The most controversial insurance practices include denying coverage for preexisting 
conditions, or revoking coverage once an individual becomes sick. Alec MacGillis, The 
Insured:  It’s Status Quo — for Now, in LANDMARK, supra note 2, at 99, 101. 
 131. PPACA §§ 2702(a), 2703(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1(a), -2(a); Hunter, supra note 87, 
at 1974. 
 132. PPACA § 2702(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a); see supra note 123 and accompanying 
text. 
 133. PPACA § 2703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2(a); see supra note 123 and accompanying 
text. 
 134. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2(b). 
2252 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
refuse or restrict coverage based on an individual’s preexisting medical 
conditions, or on the basis of health status.135
The community rating provision works in concert with the policy of 
guaranteed issue to prevent insurers from using health status as a factor 
when offering or pricing coverage.
 
136  Under the community rating 
provision, insurers may only vary individual premiums within a geographic 
area based on age and tobacco use.137  Insurers are explicitly prohibited 
from varying premiums within a geographic area based on health status.138  
This forces insurers to consider all enrollees as part of a single risk pool.139
II.  SEVERABILITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE:  
THE SPLIT OF AUTHORITY 
 
Advocates of PPACA remain certain that the individual mandate is a 
valid exercise of Congress’s constitutional authority, but assert that if the 
Supreme Court were to disagree, principles of judicial restraint counsel the 
Court to leave as much of the law intact as possible.140  Opponents of the 
law contend that the individual mandate is unconstitutional, and because the 
mandate is integral to the overall goals of health care reform, the reform 
legislation must be invalidated in its entirety.141
As of March 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 
and the U.S. District Courts for the Northern District of Florida, the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, and the Eastern District of Virginia have found the 
individual mandate to be unconstitutional, thus proceeding to the question 
of the provision’s severability.
  This part scrutinizes the 
debate over the individual mandate’s severability. 
142  Of the district court opinions, the 
Northern District of Florida held that the mandate was not severable and 
invalidated PPACA in its entirety,143
 
 135. PPACA §§ 2704(a), 2705(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-3(a), -4(a); see supra note 
 the Eastern District of Virginia found 
that the mandate was severable and excised it from the remainder of the 
124 and 
accompanying text. 
 136. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, 7, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 603 (2011) (No. 11-393), 2011 WL 4479107, at *2, *7. 
 137. PPACA § 2701(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(4). 
 138. Id. § 2701(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(B). 
 139. Id. § 1312(c)(1)–(2), 42 U.S.C. § 18032(c)(1)–(2) (requiring all health insurance 
issuers to consider all enrollees in health plans offered on the individual and small group 
markets as members of a single risk pool). 
 140. See, e.g., Consolidated Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 26–27. 
 141. See, e.g., Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans as Amicus Curiae Partially 
Supporting Certiorari Review at 15–23, Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (Nos. 11-393, 11-398, 11-
400), 2011 WL 5128125, at *15–23. 
 142. See id. at 4, 11.  For updated information regarding the status of all cases pertaining 
to PPACA, see Defending the Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/healthcare/index.html (last visited March 23, 2012). 
 143. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 
1256, 1305–06 (N.D. Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. 
granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011). 
2012] SEVERABILITY OF PPACA’S INDIVIDUAL MANDATE 2253 
law,144 and the Middle District of Pennsylvania reasoned that the mandate 
was severable but that additional, insurance-related reforms were too 
intertwined with the provision to effectively remain in force.145  The sole 
circuit court to address the issue, the Eleventh Circuit, found that the 
mandate was severable, and upheld the remainder of the legislation.146  The 
discord in these opinions is a striking example of the uncertainty inherent in 
applying modern severability doctrine.147  These conflicting decisions have 
compounded the immense uncertainty surrounding health care reform by 
articulating four different potential schemes:  PPACA as-is; PPACA 
without the individual mandate; PPACA without the mandate as well as a 
to-be-determined related set of provisions; and no PPACA at all.148
Part II of this Comment details the doctrinal conflict regarding the 
application of severability to the individual mandate:  whether a finding of 
unconstitutionality means the mandate can be excised on its own, requires 
additional excision of related provisions, or merits invalidation of the entire 
law.  This part begins by examining the arguments relied upon by 
opponents of PPACA in arguing that the individual mandate is non-
severable.  It then discusses the reasoning presented in favor of severability, 
scrutinizing the conclusions that the mandate can be excised on its own or 
that related insurance provisions must be excised as well. 
 
A.  The Argument that the Individual Mandate Is Not Severable 
The argument for non-severability rests on the view that a statute is a 
“carefully-balanced legislative bargain,” negotiated and crafted by Congress 
in order to strike a “delicate balance” between vast and competing 
concerns.149  When legislation is passed in these circumstances, Congress is 
deemed to be voting on an entire package, not on discrete provisions.150  
Accordingly, an invalid provision should be dubbed non-severable if it is 
essential to the central objective of a statutory scheme, because Congress 
presumably would not have enacted the remaining statute if it fell short of 
Congress’s overarching goal for the legislative package.151
Proponents of non-severability find support for their conclusions in the 
text of PPACA, both in its explicit language and its lack of a severability 
clause.  The text of PPACA counsels the provision’s non-severability by 
overtly characterizing the individual mandate as “essential to creating 
effective health insurance markets” where coverage is guaranteed and does 
 
 
 144. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 789–90 (E.D. Va. 2010), 
vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 145. Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 1:10-CV-763, 2011 WL 
4072875, at *19–21 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011). 
 146. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d 1235. 
 147. See Scoville, supra note 14, at 3 n.5 
 148. See Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans, supra note 141, at 4. 
 149. Brief of Amicus Curiae Family Research Council, supra note 44, at 7. 
 150. See id. 
 151. Id. at 8. 
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not exclude those with preexisting conditions.152  Thus, courts are arguably 
required to give effect to this language as an explicit pronouncement of 
congressional intent, the touchstone inquiry of whether an unconstitutional 
provision can and should be severed.153
Arguments that the individual mandate is not severable are buttressed by 
empirical evidence indicating that implementing a guaranteed issue policy 
without a mandate requiring all individuals to carry insurance will lead to a 
so-called “premium spiral” that cripples the insurance market.
 
154  
Proponents and opponents of the law have indicated that a mandate 
compelling individuals to maintain insurance coverage may be the only way 
to avoid a premium spiral while ensuring compliance with policies such as 
guaranteed issue and community rating.155  Without requiring individuals to 
carry coverage, individuals presumably would wait to obtain health 
insurance until they required medical care.156  A mandate provision 
minimizes this problem of adverse selection,157 and keeps premiums under 
control by broadening the risk pool to include more healthy individuals.158
In arguing for non-severability, the insurance industry contends that the 
Court should give great weight to the “backdrop of powerful proof” 
presented to Congress indicating that implementing guaranteed issue, 
community rating requirements, and preexisting condition provisions 
without an individual mandate would destabilize the nationwide insurance 
market.
   
159  Eight states had enacted insurance market reforms without an 
individual mandate, and experienced an overall destabilization in the 
market, most notably in the form of rising premiums and lower 
enrollment.160  For example, Congress was presented with data from New 
Jersey indicating that implementing policies of guaranteed issue and 
community rating without a mandate had initiated a premium spiral, leading 
the individual insurance market to nearly collapse.161  Even if the mandate 
is not “truly essential to comprehensive reform . . . Congress believed” it 
was162 based on the substantial evidence presented to it throughout the 
legislative process.163
 
 152. Id. at 21–22 (quoting PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(H), 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (Supp. IV 
2010)). 
  Therefore, according to the insurance industry, 
Congress intended the individual mandate to be non-severable, and courts 
 153. Id.; see supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. 
 154. John F. Sheils & Randall Haught, Without the Individual Mandate, the Affordable 
Care Act Would Still Cover 23 Million; Premiums Would Rise Less than Predicted, HEALTH 
AFF., Nov. 2011, at 1.  A premium spiral occurs when healthy individuals wait to purchase 
insurance until they actually require medical attention.  This drives up overall premiums 
because the only individuals carrying insurance are high-cost, unhealthy individuals. Siegel, 
supra note 116. 
 155. See Siegel, supra note 116. 
 156. See Brief of America’s Health Insurance Plans, supra note 141, at 18. 
 157. See infra note 203. 
 158. See PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 159. Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans, supra note 141, at 10–11. 
 160. Id. at 5. 
 161. See Consolidated Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 32. 
 162. Brief of Amicus Curiae Family Research Council, supra note 44, at 24. 
 163. Consolidated Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 32. 
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should invalidate PPACA in its entirety if the provision is to be found 
unconstitutional. 
A finding of non-severability may also be supported by PPACA’s lack of 
a severability clause, and the fact that two earlier versions of the bill had 
contained one.164  The absence of a severability clause may be significant 
when one is included in earlier versions of the bill, but is later removed, 
because “[w]here Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version 
of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the 
limitation was not intended.”165  Although not dispositive, it does counsel 
the conclusion that Congress intended that the Act’s provisions “operate 
together or not at all.”166  This element of PPACA’s textual history, 
coupled with Congress’s explicit assertion that the individual mandate is 
“essential” to accomplishing the law’s target reforms, support the position 
that the individual mandate is not severable.167
Further, advocates for non-severability state that if courts have 
“significant doubt” about whether Congress would have enacted PPACA 
without the individual mandate, there is a sufficient basis to invalidate the 
entire statute.
 
168  Courts should “err on the side of caution” by doing so and 
allowing Congress itself to reconsider the issue.169  Invoking the principles 
of institutional competence and constitutional limitations, courts are urged 
not to excise invalid provisions if doing so would require rebalancing of a 
complex statutory scheme, as this would constitute a serious encroachment 
into the legislative domain that courts are neither permitted nor qualified to 
undertake.170
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida held that the 
individual mandate provision of PPACA exceeded Congress’s power under 
the Constitution, and that the mandate was not severable, rendering the 
 
 
 164. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 
1256, 1301 (N.D. Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 
F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. 
granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).  The two prior versions of the bill that included a 
severability clause were H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), and H.R. 3962, 111th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). 
 165. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22–24 (1983); see also supra note 44 and 
accompanying text. 
 166. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Family Research Council, supra note 44, at 22 (quoting 
Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1267 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 167. Id. at 23. 
 168. See id. at 12. 
 169. Id. (noting that “if [courts] are satisfied that it would not, or that the matter is in such 
doubt that we are unable to say what Congress would have done omitting the 
unconstitutional feature, then the statute must fall” (citing El Paso & Ne. Ry. v. Gutierrez, 
215 U.S. 87, 97 (1909))). 
 170. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329–30 (2006) (“Our 
ability to devise a judicial remedy that does not entail quintessentially legislative work often 
depends on how clearly we have already articulated the background constitutional rules at 
issue . . . .  But making distinctions in a murky constitutional context, or where line-drawing 
is inherently complex may call for a ‘far more serious invasion of the legislative domain’ 
than we ought to undertake.” (quoting United States v. Treasury Emps., 513 U.S. 454, 479 
n.26 (1995))). 
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entire law unconstitutional.171  In Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, various parties, including twenty-six states, 
two uninsured private citizens, and a business association,172 challenged the 
minimum coverage provision of PPACA.173  District Court Judge Roger 
Vinson granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs,174 finding that 
Congress lacked the constitutional authority to promulgate the individual 
mandate under either the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.175  Further, Judge Vinson found that the individual mandate was 
not severable, and, accordingly, held that PPACA must be stricken in its 
entirety.176
Judge Vinson articulated the severability analysis as consisting of a two-
part test:  (1) a determination of whether the remaining provisions can 
function independently of the stricken provision “in a manner consistent 
with the intent of Congress,”
 
177 and (2) an assessment of whether the 
statute’s text or legislative history indicate that Congress would have 
preferred no statute at all to a statute not containing the stricken 
provision.178
As to the first part, the court noted that a complex, lengthy statute with 
hundreds of sections certainly has a number of provisions that are capable 
of functioning independently of the individual mandate, many of which had 
already taken effect.
 
179  However, the court noted that the focus of this 
determination is not a practical or technical inquiry, but rather one that asks 
whether the remaining provisions will comprise a statute that is in 
accordance with congressional intent.180
The court then addressed the Act’s lack of a severability clause.
 
181  The 
court acknowledged that the absence of a severability clause is insufficient 
to raise a presumption against severability on its own merits, but asserted 
that it still held potential relevance to the overall inquiry.182  The court went 
on to point out that the absence of a severability clause was particularly 
significant to an analysis of PPACA, as prior versions of the bill did contain 
one.183
 
 171. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 
1256, 1305–06 (N.D. Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 
(2011). 
  Judge Vinson reasoned that this meant a severability clause was 
intentionally omitted from the Act as enacted, particularly since the 
 172. Id. at 1263. 
 173. Id. at 1265. 
 174. Id. at 1307. 
 175. Id. at 1298. 
 176. Id. at 1305–06. 
 177. Id. at 1300 (citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987)). 
 178. Id. at 1300–01 (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 
S. Ct. 3138, 3161–62 (2010)). 
 179. Id. at 1300. 
 180. Id. (citing Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684). 
 181. Id. at 1301. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
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individual mandate was highly controversial throughout the legislative 
process, giving Congress fair warning that legal challenges against the 
mandate were likely.184  Judge Vinson concluded that the ultimate absence 
of a severability clause served as strong evidence that Congress believed the 
Act could not achieve its overarching aim of health insurance reform unless 
the individual mandate was included.185
The court further seized on the government’s statements conceding that 
the health insurance reforms of PPACA could not survive without the 
individual mandate.
 
186  Legislative debates and presidential speeches were 
all premised upon a goal of health insurance reform, and proponents of the 
bill repeatedly stressed that the legislation was the “means to 
comprehensively reform the health insurance industry.”187  In a 
memorandum seeking dismissal of the suit, the defendants stipulated to the 
essential role of the individual mandate in achieving a “comprehensive 
scheme [ensuring the availability and affordability]” of health insurance 
coverage, and noted that without all of the health insurance provisions 
working in tandem, regulatory reform would be ineffective.188  Thus, the 
court analogized the situation to New York v. United States,189 where the 
Supreme Court suggested that legislation should be struck in its entirety 
where its purpose would be undermined by invalidation of one or more of 
its provisions.190  Judge Vinson concluded that the grouping of insurance 
provisions embodied the core of the Act.191
Balancing these concerns and findings with the guiding principles of 
severability enunciated in Ayotte,
 
192 the court found that “reconfiguring an 
exceedingly lengthy and comprehensive legislative scheme” would be 
inconsistent with the overarching aims of separation of powers and judicial 
restraint.193
 
 184. Id. at 1301; see also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983) (“Where 
Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to 
enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended.”). 
  If the courts were to sever the individual mandate from 
PPACA along with the other insurance reforms, the inquiry into whether 
each remaining section was intended by Congress to stand independently of 
the individual mandate would be an extensive, time-consuming, line-by-line 
analysis “tantamount to rewriting a statute” in order to ensure constitutional 
 185. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1301. 
 186. Id. at 1301–02. 
 187. Id. at 1302  (citing Morning Edition:  Analyzing Democrats’ Word Shift on Health 
Care, NPR (Nov. 17, 2009); News Conference by the President, July 22, 2009, WHITE 
HOUSE (July 23, 2009),  http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/news-conference-
president-july-22-2009). 
 188. Id. 
 189. 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text. 
 190. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1303. 
 191. Id. at 1301 (“[T]he Act’s health insurance reforms cannot survive without the 
individual mandate, which is extremely significant because the various insurance provisions, 
in turn, are the very heart of the Act itself.”); id. at 1303 (“[T]he individual mandate is 
indisputably necessary to the Act’s insurance market reforms, which are, in turn, 
indisputably necessary to the purpose of the Act.”). 
 192. 546 U.S. 320 (2006); see supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 193. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1304; see supra Part I.A. 
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conformity, and would essentially “second guess” what Congress would 
want to remain in effect.194
The court concluded its assessment by likening PPACA to a “finely 
crafted watch” containing too many dependent and moving parts for the 
judiciary to “dissect out the proper from the improper, and the able-to-
stand-alone from the unable-to-stand-alone.”
 
195  Such “quasi-legislative 
‘line drawing’” would be a serious encroachment into the congressional 
realm; thus, according to the court, the Act as currently drafted is akin to a 
“defectively designed watch” that must be “redesigned and reconstructed by 
the watchmaker”—in this case, Congress, not the courts.196
B.  The Argument that the Individual Mandate Is Severable 
 
1.  The Mandate Is Severable on Its Own 
Proponents of the individual mandate’s severability argue that 
invalidating the entire statute is contrary to the traditional applications of 
severability doctrine.197  Generally, courts presume validity and are 
obligated to take objective measures to “maintain the act in so far as it is 
valid.”198  If a court does not attempt to preserve as much of the statute as 
possible, it is arguably using its remedial powers to sidestep legislative 
intent.199  With the balance of a statute presumed valid, courts should 
carefully scrutinize the remainder of the law and look for “clear evidence” 
in assessing whether it can stand as fully operative as law, or if it is too 
closely connected to the invalid provision that the rest also must be 
struck.200  Advocates of PPACA’s severability also contend that 
eliminating the individual mandate would not have the disastrous effects on 
the insurance market that many fear.201
 
 194. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1304. 
  Some policy analysts project that 
premiums in the individual market would indeed rise if no mandate were 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1304–05. 
 197. See Brief of Nat’l Indian Health Bd. et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants 
at 22, Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 
(11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 603, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. granted in part, 
132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067), 2011 WL 1461594, at *22. 
 198. Id. (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652–53 (1984)). 
 199. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1322 (acknowledging the judiciary’s duty 
to exercise restraint in invalidating statutory provisions where it is uncertain whether such 
provisions are in accordance with congressional intent). 
 200. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete Severability 
(Severability), supra note 89, at 8. (“[T]he Court should have clear evidence that Congress, 
faced with the unconstitutionality of one part of a statute, would have wanted some or all of 
the remaining parts stuck down as well.”); see Brief of Nat’l Indian Health Bd. et al. as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note 197, at 24 (“If careful analysis is required 
to determine that a particular provision of a statute is unconstitutional, it stands to reason that 
the remaining portions of the statute, presumed valid, should also be scrutinized carefully 
before determining if they are independent ‘fully operative’ provisions of law and therefore 
remain valid, or if they bear such close connection to the unconstitutional provision that they 
too must be invalidated.”). 
 201. See, e.g., Sheils & Haught, supra note 154, at 7. 
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implemented, but estimate that approximately twenty-one to twenty-four 
million additional people would be insured.202  Additional provisions in the 
law, such as subsidies and restricted open enrollment periods, would 
mitigate the feared effects of rising premiums and decreasing enrollment.203  
Thus, while the individual mandate would achieve lower premiums and 
higher overall levels of coverage, it is not necessarily essential to achieving 
the Act’s goals.204
In Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services,
 
205 the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court on this 
point.  Although the court affirmed that the minimum coverage provision 
was unconstitutional, it held that the mandate was severable from the 
remaining provisions.206
The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court—the sole court to hold 
that the mandate is non-severable—misapplied severability doctrine and 
failed to adequately scrutinize the remainder of the law before making a 
determination as to its validity.
 
207  The lower court had explicitly stated that 
it had no intention of reviewing the entire law because of the “considerable 
time and extensive briefing” needed to parse through such a lengthy and 
complex statute.208  However, by failing to do so, the Eleventh Circuit held 
that the lower court misconstrued severability doctrine and erred by not 
maintaining the act insofar as it was valid.209  The Eleven Circuit went on 
to note that a more thorough review of PPACA indicates that the majority 
of its “myriad provisions” are wholly unrelated to private insurance, much 
less directly linked to the individual mandate; thus, its excision does not 
preclude the Act from remaining “fully operative as a law.”210
In reversing, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that the lower court had 
unduly relied on the lack of an explicit severability clause in PPACA in 
finding that the entire 975-page law should be invalidated, with a heavy 
 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. (“The primary reason for [lesser-than-expected effects on premium and coverage 
projections] is that two-thirds of all people with nongroup coverage under the act are eligible 
for premium subsidies and would be protected against much or even all of the premium 
increase.  This would reduce the coverage loss from lifting the mandate and restrain 
premium increases in the nongroup market.”).  The restricted open enrollment periods 
mitigate adverse selection among individuals who would choose to forego obtaining 
insurance coverage until they actually need it.  These individuals would be forced to bear the 
risk of any unforeseen insurance needs that arise prior to the next enrollment period; thus, 
the open enrollment periods substantially raise the stakes for individuals who would delay in 
obtaining coverage. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete 
Severability (Severability), supra note 89, at 36.  
 204. See Sheils & Haught, supra note 154, at 7. 
 205. 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 603, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 
604, cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011). 
 206. Id. at 1328. 
 207. See id. at 1323. 
 208. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 
1256, 1304 (N.D. Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d 1235. 
 209. See supra notes 171–96, 200 and accompanying text. 
 210. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1322. 
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emphasis on a prior version of PPACA containing such a clause.211  The 
district court had concluded that the removal of a severability clause during 
the bill’s revision process operated as strong evidence that Congress 
believed the law could not operate as intended without the mandate; in light 
of established precedent regarding the weight to be accorded to the absence 
of a severability clause,212 the circuit court held that such an inference went 
too far.213
The court pointed out that the drafting manuals for both houses of 
Congress indicate that severability clauses are unnecessary unless they are 
stipulating that certain provisions are non-severable; therefore, the initial 
inclusion and subsequent removal of a severability clause should not 
function as indicia of congressional intent against severability.
 
214  As such, 
the circuit court held that insufficient evidence had been presented to rebut 
the general presumption of severability, and, accordingly, that the district 
court had erred in wholesale invalidation of the Act.215
The Eleventh Circuit went on to address whether invalidation of the 
minimum coverage provision also mandated severance of the guaranteed 
issue and preexisting condition provisions.
 
216  The court framed the inquiry 
as whether Congress would have enacted either of these two reforms had 
the individual mandate not also been included.217  It concluded that an Act 
containing those two reforms was still in full accordance with Congress’s 
intent to “make health insurance coverage accessible and thereby to reduce 
the number of uninsured persons.”218  The court also indicated that none of 
the related insurance provisions contained any cross-reference to the 
individual mandate provision, or stipulated their dependence on it.219  
Further buttressing the independence of the provisions, the court noted that 
the preexisting condition provision had already come into limited effect, 
four years prior to the effective date of the individual mandate.220  A 
legislative scheme containing both a guaranteed issue and a preexisting 
condition provision “hew[s] more closely to Congress’s likely intent” than a 
scheme that does not.221
The court further emphasized that the question of severability is 
markedly different from constitutional analysis, and that evidence in the 
legislative history concerning the individual mandate was not strong enough 
to overcome the presumption of severability.
 
222
 
 211. Id. at 1322–23. 
  The legislative history 
 212. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 213. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1322. 
 214. Id. at 1322–23. 
 215. Id. at 1323. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 1324. 
 218. Id. at 1324–25. 
 219. Id. at 1324 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260 (2005) (asserting that 
where a statutory provision “contains critical cross-references” to an excised provision, that 
provision must also be severed for similar reasons)). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 1325. 
 222. Id. at 1327–28. 
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indicated that the individual mandate increases the effectiveness of the other 
insurance reforms, but simply because the absence of the mandate 
“render[s] these provisions less desirable” did not lead the court to the 
conclusion that Congress would have preferred that they not be enacted.223  
Accordingly, the court found insufficient evidence to conclude that 
Congress would not have enacted the two reforms without an individual 
mandate; thus, the court held that the mandate was severable, and stipulated 
that any alterations to a subsequent legislative scheme should be made by 
Congress.224
In Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius,
 
225 the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia also found the individual mandate to be 
unconstitutional, and held that it was severable from PPACA.  The court 
recognized the plaintiff’s repeated contentions that the mandate was the 
“linchpin” of the health care reforms, but concluded that a finding of non-
severability was inappropriate, as the law’s scope extended far beyond that 
provision.226
In coming to its conclusion, the court focused on traditional principles of 
judicial restraint, institutional competence, and legislative preservation.
 
227  
PPACA had been hastily rushed to the congressional floor on Christmas 
Eve for a final vote, and the court felt it impracticable to conduct the 
required inquiry into legislative intent under these circumstances.228  Based 
on the insufficient legislative history and inadequate record before it, the 
court stated that it could not ascertain whether Congress would have passed 
the bill had the mandate not been included because such a determination 
would have been impermissibly speculative.229  Accordingly, the court 
elected to “hew closely to the time-honored rule to sever with 
circumspection,” severing only the offensive provision and any directly 
dependent provisions that make specific reference to it.230
2.  The Mandate Is Severable, but Requires Excising Additional Insurance 
Reforms 
 
As an alternative to their principal arguments, both opponents and 
proponents of PPACA take a middle-ground stance regarding the individual 
mandate’s severability.  Opponents argue foremost that the provision is 
unconstitutional and non-severable, and should therefore cause the entire 
statute to fall; alternatively, they contend that if the Court is disinclined to 
find the mandate non-severable, it should still strike additional insurance 
 
 223. Id. at 1327. 
 224. Id. at 1327–28. 
 225. 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 226. Id. at 789. 
 227. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162 
(2010); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006); Virginia 
ex rel. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 789 (citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 
678, 684 (1987)); supra Part I.A. 
 228. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 789. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 790. 
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reforms that are related to the individual mandate.231  Some proponents 
principally contend that the provision is constitutional, but pose an identical 
alternative argument regarding severance of the mandate and related 
reforms.232  This approach relies on similar arguments to those of non-
severability, but stops short of counseling invalidation of the entire statute.  
Opponents and proponents alike argue that the individual mandate is the 
“linchpin” of PPACA because it “ensures the cash flow into the insurance 
market necessary to offset the resulting costs” of guaranteed issue and 
community rating.233  They assert that Congress would not have enacted 
other insurance reforms that would “deplet[e] the market of funds” without 
the primary revenue-generator for the market.234  This argument primarily 
rests on assertions that (1) the legislative history of PPACA indicates that 
the provisions are non-severable, and (2) that, practically speaking, an 
insurance market that employs guaranteed issue and community rating 
policies without an individual mandate will suffer from adverse selection 
and a premium “death spiral.”235  Therefore, if the individual mandate is 
found unconstitutional and severable from PPACA, closely related 
provisions must be removed as well.236
The Middle District of Pennsylvania adopted this middle-ground position 
in Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
 
237  
The court struck down the individual mandate as beyond Congress’s 
enumerated powers under the Constitution, and found that the provision 
was severable from PPACA; however, the court ruled that the mandate was 
inextricably linked to the guaranteed issue,238 community rating,239 and 
preexisting condition240 provisions of the law, such that all three needed to 
be invalidated along with the mandate.241
 
 231. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Family Research Council, supra note 
  The court primarily based this 
decision on the fact that the minimum coverage provision functioned as a 
partial funding mechanism for both the guaranteed issue and preexisting 
44, at 29 (“[I]f this 
Court invalidates Section 1501 but declines to invalidate [PPACA] entirely, this Court 
should instead invalidate all the provisions of the Act that impact the cost of healthcare 
premiums.”). 
 232. See Consolidated Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 10, 31 (“For the reasons 
stated in its certiorari petition, the federal government believes Congress had Article I 
authority to enact the minimum coverage provision. . . .  In the event this Court disagrees, 
however, the federal government believes it would be appropriate for the Court to consider 
certain issues concerning whether additional provisions of the Act should be held inseverable 
in this case. . . .  The court of appeals did err . . . in holding that the guaranteed-issue and 
community-rating provisions that will take effect in 2014 can be severed from the minimum 
coverage provision.”). 
 233. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Family Research Council, supra note 44, at 29; Siegel, 
supra note 116. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete Severability 
(Severability), supra note 89, at 24–25. 
 236. Brief of Amicus Curiae Family Research Council, supra note 44, at 29. 
 237. 811 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1110–11 (M.D. Pa. 2011). 
 238. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 241. Goudy-Bachman, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 1110–11. 
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condition provisions.242  Additionally, the government itself conceded at 
oral argument that the preexisting conditions and guaranteed issues 
provisions “[were] absolutely intertwined” with the individual mandate.243  
Thus, the court found that a finding of unconstitutionality required that 
those three additional components be removed from PPACA.244
III.  LIMITING THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM:  
THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION IS SEVERABLE 
 
Part III of this Comment asserts that the individual mandate is severable, 
and that if the Supreme Court finds it unconstitutional, it should exercise 
restraint and leave the remainder of PPACA in force. 
Invalidation of PPACA in its entirety is not an appropriate remedy for 
finding the mandate unconstitutional.  The mere prospect that the Act’s 
other insurance-related provisions may function less effectively in the 
absence of an individual mandate is not an invitation for the judiciary to 
infer that the ultimate success of the whole Act depends on one provision 
out of several hundred.245  The ambiguity of severability doctrine may 
encourage analysis that supports one’s predetermined political view of 
reform,246
Further, advocates of non-severability place undue weight on the Act’s 
lack of a severability clause.
 and the Court should be hesitant to employ such a drastic remedy 
on a highly contentious and partisan platform. 
247  Congress could have easily included an 
inseverability clause, particularly if removal of the severability clause was 
indeed intended to rebut a presumption of severability.248  The legislative 
history of PPACA offers no indication of why certain prior versions of the 
bill contained severability clauses, and “speculation based on nothing more 
than [unexplained] congressional silence is properly regarded as 
treacherous.”249
 
 242. Id. 
  This approach to congressional silence is particularly 
salient in these circumstances, since both House and Senate drafting 
 243. Transcript of Oral Argument at 56, Goudy-Bachman, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (No. 
1:10-CV-763). 
 244. Goudy-Bachman, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 1111. 
 245. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 246. See Hunter, supra note 95, at 1973 (“In the subtext to those arguments [against the 
individual mandate] are the radically different visions of the meaning of the social 
obligations of citizenship that are fueling popular understandings and debates over the social 
meaning of the new law.”); Pershing, supra note 9 (“Democrats say the constitutionality 
argument [against the individual mandate] is a stalking-horse for . . . broader opposition to 
reform.”). 
 247. See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text. 
 248. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 
1324 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 603, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. granted in 
part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011). 
 249. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete Severability 
(Severability), supra note 89, at 30.  It is also worth nothing that the prior versions of the bill 
that did contain severability clauses were not the bills that would ultimately become the final 
version of PPACA. Id. 
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manuals instruct lawmakers that severability clauses are not necessary in 
proposed legislation.250
Others contend that the individual mandate is integral to the related 
insurance reforms of PPACA, and speculate that Congress would not have 
passed these provisions had a mandate not been present.
   
251  This position is 
not so summarily dismissed, but ultimately fails as well.  Under 
contemporary severability doctrine, the Court is bound by notions of 
judicial restraint, and a particularized inquiry into the workability of 
specialized insurance reforms is best undertaken in a subsequent endeavor 
by the legislature.252
Much empirical evidence exists to suggest that the functionality and 
effectiveness of PPACA’s insurance market reforms depend upon the 
presence of an individual mandate,
 
253 but countervailing evidence exists as 
well.254  The arguments for non-severability largely rest on empirical 
evidence suggesting that insurance reforms will not only be ineffective, but 
potentially catastrophic, if no individual mandate is included.  This should 
certainly give the Court pause; however, it is not for the judiciary to analyze 
data and weigh probabilities regarding which scenario is more likely to 
occur if the mandate is struck, or to comb through hundreds of provisions 
determining which pass some unknown threshold of interdependence.255  
This is the task of the legislature, and not one for the courts to take up 
retroactively on the legislature’s behalf.256  Although PPACA’s insurance 
reforms were designed to work in concert, and may in fact operate less 
effectively without an individual mandate, it does not follow that Congress 
would prefer a statutory scheme that reinstates an insurance market where 
large numbers of individuals with preexisting conditions are excluded.257
 
 250. Id.; see supra notes 
  
There is also a significant body of evidence suggesting that excising the 
individual mandate from PPACA’s reforms will not actually cause “death 
214–15 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 252. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text. 
 255. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete Severability 
(Severability), supra note 89, at 34 (“[T]his kind of predictive factfinding about the interplay 
of complex economic forces falls more naturally within the scope of legislative, rather than 
judicial, competence.”). 
 256. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete Severability 
(Severability), supra note 89 at 34. 
 257. See id. at 28–29 (noting that even if no general presumption of severability was 
observed, “it would still seem appropriate for the Court to insist upon a clear indication of 
Congress’s intent before concluding that the severability result most consistent with 
congressional policy would be to deny coverage to many people that Congress indisputably 
meant to help”).  In support of the claim that the other insurance reforms are still capable of 
achieving Congress’s objectives, the Department of Health and Human Services released an 
annual report indicating that the Pre-existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP) saw a 400 
percent increase in enrollment between November 2010 and November 2011. CTR. FOR 
CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COVERING 
PEOPLE WITH PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS:  REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION 
OF THE PRE-EXISTING CONDITION INSURANCE PLAN PROGRAM (Feb. 23, 2012), available at 
http://www.cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/02242012/pcip-annual-report.pdf. 
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spiral” activity.258  The role of the judiciary in a severability analysis is 
limited to an examination of congressional intent, guided by an active effort 
to maintain as much of the pertinent legislation as possible.259
The Eleventh Circuit’s respect and sensitivity to both the limited role of 
the courts in invalidating legislation and the judiciary’s longstanding 
preference for severability led to a proper application of the doctrine to 
PPACA.
  Where such 
a specific determination of legislative intent proves impossible or too 
speculative, as here, the judiciary would overstep its own constitutional 
authority by interposing its judgment for that of Congress. 
260  The court recognized that ascertaining legislative intent is a 
speculative and largely evasive endeavor, particularly without the limited 
helpfulness of a severability or non-severability clause.261
CONCLUSION 
  These guiding 
principles, as well as the difficulty inherent in determining congressional 
intent with respect to a 975-page law, correctly directed the court to reject 
wholesale invalidation of PPACA.  The Supreme Court should reach the 
same conclusion. 
This Comment endeavors to provide guidance in navigating the murky 
waters of severability doctrine, and how the doctrine should be applied to 
PPACA.  It does not advocate modification of current severability 
principles—although the doctrine is certainly in need of clarification—but it 
does encourage the Court to closely adhere to its articulated preferences for 
presumptions of severability and principles of judicial restraint.  Deviating 
from these central premises, particularly in such a contentious and highly 
consequential context, would amount to a drastic encroachment into the 
realm of the legislature.  
Because of severability doctrine’s malleability, it is especially susceptible 
to interpretations that are based, intentionally or not, on the ideology of the 
Justices.  The Court should be especially wary of overreaching.  In the 
event that the Court finds that Congress exceeded its constitutional 
boundaries in enacting the individual mandate, it should find the provision 
severable and leave the remainder of the Act untouched.  This result 
comports with governing principles of severability doctrine as currently 
 
 258. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete Severability 
(Severability), supra note 89, at 38–41.  Much of the evidence put forth in support of non-
severability relied on the experiences of several states who enacted guarantee issue and 
community rating policies without an individual mandate, and subsequently experienced cost 
spiral activity.  See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text. These states, however, did 
not include an extensive program of subsidization and limited enrollment, such as the one 
provided for by PPACA, and thus cannot serve as a reliable model for simulating or 
comparing results. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete 
Severability (Severability), supra note 89, at 42. 
 259. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
 260. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 
1235, 1320–21 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 603, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. 
granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011). 
 261. Id. 
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articulated, and shifts the burden of any required additional reworking of 
PPACA’s provisions back to the appropriate government actor:  Congress. 
 
